COPYRIGHT:  \u3ci\u3eAmerican Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.:\u3c/i\u3e  Copyright and Corporate Photocopying by Patry, William
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 2 Article 5
2-1-1995
COPYRIGHT: American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc.: Copyright and Corporate
Photocopying
William Patry
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
William Patry, COPYRIGHT: American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.: Copyright and Corporate Photocopying, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 429
(1995).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol61/iss2/5
AMERICAN GEOPHYSICAL UNION V. TEXACO,
INC.*: COPYRIGHT AND CORPORATE
PHOTOCOPYING"
William Patry
INTRODUCTION: PHOTOCOPYING As FAIR USE
The availability of the fair use defense for photocopying of
copyrighted works was a hotly contested issue during the
twelve-year effort to revise the 1909 Copyright Act that culmi-
nated in the omnibus revision act of 1976. The dispute, how-
ever, focused principally on copying by nonprofit educational
institutions, not by for-profit corporations. Educators claimed
that broad fair use privileges were necessary to carry out their
classroom activities. Authors and publishers countered that
such broad privileges would erode an important market,
whether sales or licensing. The question of whether photocopy-
ing is privileged was addressed, though not resolved, in sec-
tions 107 and 108 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 107
recognizes the formerly judge-made defense of fair use,2 while
* 802 F. Supp. 1 (S).DN.Y. 1992), affid, 37 F.Sd 881 (2d Cir. 1994) as
amended on denial of reh'g (Dec. 23, 1994) amended opinion issued, 60 F.Sd 913
(2d Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.SL.W. 3788 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1995).
** @1995 William Patry.
t Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University, New York, N.Y. The author represented the plaintiffis during
preliminary proceedings in the Texaco case.
1 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1976). That Act has been revised a number of times.
See WILLIAM PATRY, 1 COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 89-120 (1994).
2 Section 107 reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purpos-
es such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multi-
ple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in a
particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall include--
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and subdtantiality of the
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section 108 concerns copying by libraries.3 The reference to
photocopying in section 107 is in the preamble, which lists
"multiple copying for classroom use" as a possible type of fair
use. Whether copying in a particular instance, including for
classroom purposes, is a fair use must be determined on a
case-by-case basis by evaluating four factors laid out in the
statute and any others the court finds relevant.4 The four stat-
utory factors are (1) purpose and character of the use; (2) na-
ture of the copyrighted work; (3) amount and substantiality of
the material copied; and (4) the market effect of the use.'
Following passage of the 1976 Act, publishers began an
effort to educate the academic community and corporations
about their obligations under the new law. When these efforts
proved somewhat unsatisfactory, a number of copyright in-
fringement suits were brought,6 all of which were settled be-
fore trial. In 1985, though, a suit arose that would not be so
easily resolved.
I. THE TEXACO CASE
In 1985, six publishers of scientific, technical and medical
journals, backed by the Association of American Publishers,
filed a class action copyright complaint against Texaco, Inc. in
the Southern District of New York. The publishers alleged that
Texaco had committed infringement by making unauthorized
copies of articles appearing in their journals.7 The plaintiffs
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyright-
ed work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above fac-
tors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. V 1981, 1988 & Supp. V 1993).
See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
' See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
'See WILLIAM PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 210-26 (2d
ed. 1995).
' The suit did not involve claims of infringement for violating the copyright in
the journal as a whole, a "collective work" in copyright parlance, see 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1978) (definition of "collective work"), but rather only in the individual arti-
cles (written and originally owned by scientists not employed by plaintiffs). This
distinction had important consequences for the court of appeals's analysis of the
third and fourth factors. See text accompanying notes 95-102.
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had registered their journals with the Copyright Clearance
Center (CCC), a not-for-profit Massachusetts corporation estab-
lished in 1977 by publishers, authors and users to act as a
clearinghouse for those wishing to make photocopies.' Users
who sign up with the CCC need not seek advance permission
to make photocopies of CCC-registered works; they need only
pay a license fee after the fact.9
The CCC offers two types of license services. The first is
the "Transactional Reporting Service," pursuant to which one
reports each copy made to the CCC and pays for each article
copied according to a fee set by the publisher." The transac-
tional service is used mostly by small document delivery ser-
vices and businesses." The second license service is the "An-
nual Authorization Service," pursuant to which one pays a
fixed fee per year set by the CCC without the need to report
the copies made.' The "annualized" license is used mostly by
large organizations. From 1978 to the end of 1989, the CCC
received approximately $9 million from the transactional ser-
vice and $18 million from the annualized service. 3
Until a settlement in 1995, Texaco utilized the transac-
tional license. Based on the small number of copies Texaco
reported to the CCC relative to the number of research scien-
tists it employed (and on the plaintiffs' estimates of the aver-
age number of photocopies research scientists make), the plain-
tiffs alleged that Texaco was underreporting the number of
photocopies its scientists made, and, therefore, committing
infringement.'4 One of the plaintiffs' objectives was to encour-
age large corporations to subscribe to the annualized license
' American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 7 (SI).N.Y.
1992), affd, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), as amended on denial of reh'g (Dec. 23,
1994), amended opinion issued, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed,
63 U.SJL.W. 3788 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1995).
9Id.
" Id.
U Id. at 8 n.6.
2 Id. at 8.
, As of January 1991, there were 400 users of the transactional service and
100 corporate users of the annualized service. Id.
' The Texaco case was unusual in that when the complaint was filed, plain-
tiffs did not allege infringement of any particular work, only that Texaco must
have infringed some of their works given the low number of copies reported by
the company to the CCC. Judge Leval's decision to let the case proceed on
plaintiffs' probability theory was path-breaking.
199b-]
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service with its much lower administrative costs (but higher
fees). That goal would be thwarted if corporations believed
they could subscribe to the transactional service, underreport
the actual number of copies made, and then allege fair use if
caught. Texaco denied underreporting and also took the posi-
tion that any unreported copying was privileged as a fair use
under section 107 of the Copyright Act.15
The case was assigned to then-district-judge Pierre N.
Leval, no stranger to fair use disputes. 6 In order to avoid
"untoward discovery expenses with respect to largely
duplicative matters," the parties entered into a stipulation by
which Judge Leval would first try Texaco's fair use claim,
temporarily bypassing a host of other defenses the company
had raised, such as the publishers' possible lack of copyright
transfers from journal authors."7 In the stipulation, the par-
ties also agreed to use unreported copies of articles from one
journal made by a randomly picked scientist as indicative of
what would be found in the files of the approximately 500
other scientists employed by Texaco. 8
The journal selected was Catalysis, published monthly by
plaintiff Academic Press. "Catalysis" as a field concerns "the
change in the rate of a chemical reaction brought about by
often small amounts of a substance that is unchanged chemi-
cally at the end of the reaction." 9 The randomly picked scien-
tist was Dr. Donald Chickering II, employed by Texaco's Bea-
con, New York facility as a chemical engineer specializing in
Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 25 n.23; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. V 1993).
18 Judge Leval, who now sits on the Second Circuit, has presided over a num-
ber of fair use cases and written articles on the law in this area. See e.g., New
Era Publications Intl ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (SD.N.Y.
1988), affd on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), petition for reh'g en banc
denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990); Craft v.
Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.).N.Y. 1987); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F.
Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987). See also Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter's Rescue of
Fair Use, 13 CARDOZO A. & E. L.J. 19 (1994); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990) [hereinafter "Fair Use Standard"]; Pierro
N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul? The Nineteenth Donald C. Brace Lecture, 36 J. COPY-
RIGHT Soc'Y 167 (1989).
1 Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 5, n.1; Procedural and Scheduling Stipulation and
Order Governing the Fair Use Trial, entered July 26, 1990.
1" Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 5.
19 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 350 (1976)).
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catalysts and catalysis.'
Academic Press had registered with the CCC.2" It also
offered back issues and reprints of Catalysis for sale.
Texaco's Beacon facility had purchased one subscription to
Catalysis until 1983, when it doubled the number to two.' In
1988, the number of subscriptions was increased to three.24
Chickering did not have his own subscription, reading instead
one of Texaco's copies when it was circulated to employees who
had requested placement on a circulation list. 'Whenever he
wanted a copy of an article appearing in Catalysis, Texaco
made one for him. No payments were made to the CCC nor
was authorization otherwise obtained.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION
The case was tried as a bench trial on papers submitted by
the parties and was treated by Judge Leval as a test case. This
was the manner in which the plaintiffs brought it and which,
by virtue of the stipulation, defendants agreed to try it.' The
purpose of the stipulation was thus not to limit the case to the
randomly selected facts, but to use those facts as practices
representative of Texaco's copying practices. The stipulated
evidence showed that Chickering copied eight articles in their
entirety from Catalysis.' Chickering became aware of six of
the articles through circulation to him of the original journal
issue in which the articles appeared. He became aware of the
other two by seeing references to them in another article.Y Of
the articles copied, Chickering used only three in his re-
search.'
21 Id.
21 Id. at 7.
2 Id.
2 Id.
I Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 7.
2' Id. at 6.
2s Id.
27 Id. at 5 n.1.
=' Id. at 6 n.2.
Texaco, 37 F.3d at 884.
'Id.
19951
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A. The First Fair Use Factor: The Purpose and Character of
the Use
The first statutory fair use factor requires courts to exam-
ine "the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes."31 In a comprehensive analysis of the fair use
doctrine issued before the Supreme Court's 1994 opinion in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,32 but anticipating that
decision, Judge Leval recited language from the Court's 1984
decision in Sony Corp. of America, Inc. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc.' Sony was an atypical fair use case: litigation
brought by motion picture companies against the manufacturer
of the "Betamax" videotape recorder for contributory infringe-
ment. While Sony referred to presumptions for commercial as
opposed to noncommercial uses, Judge Leval added that the
Sony Court did not "overturn the preexisting concept that pro-
ductive or transformative uses were favored over nonproduc-
tive, merely superseding copies." 4 Reviewing the caselaw sub-
sequent to Sony, Judge Leval found what he characterized as a
"two-track pattern of interpretation" of the first fair use factor:
Secondary users have succeeded in winning the first factor by rea-
son of either (1) transformative (or productive) nonsuperseding use
of the original, or (2) noncommercial use, generally for a socially
beneficial or widely accepted purpose. Where courts have considered
transformative, non-superseding secondary uses of the type that
were favored in the historical development of fair use, they have
attached little importance to the presence of profit motivation 5
Transformative or productive uses are generally uses by a
second author of portions of a first author's work in the cre-
ation of new work which will itself promote the progress of
science, thereby benefitting the public. Judge Leval correctly
found that Texaco's mechanical copying of the entirety of the
journal articles was neither transformative nor productive, but
instead copying that superseded the original. Such copying
31 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 12.
3Id.
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"contributes nothing new or different to the original copyright-
ed work.... This is the type of superseding copying that has
been disfavored since the earliest discussions of the doc-
trine ....
Turning to the issue of whether Texaco's copying was for
commercial or noncommercial purposes, Judge Leval found
that Chickering's copying was not for "personal use" as Texaco
alleged, but instead for "research pursuant to Chickering's
employment for the benefit of his employer, Texaco.' Judge
Leval rejected Texaco's fatuous assertion that its copying
"should be considered comparable to that in Williams &
Wilkins v. United States-copying done by scientists for the
purpose of advancing science, rather than for commercial
gain.' 3s Williams & Wilkins, unlike Texaco, involved photo-
copying done by the National Institutes of Health and the
National Library of Medicine for the benefit of their own re-
search purposes. Distinguishing Williams & Wilkins, Judge
Leval concluded that in Texaco's case "the research is being
conducted for commercial gain. Its purpose is to create new
products and processes for Texaco that will improve its compet-
Id. at 13. Judge Leval rejected Texaco's argument that its copying was pro-
ductive because its alleged purpose was "to advance scientific discovery," id., find-
ing that "productive" as used in the caselaw means use of the original to create a
new work, which Texaco had not done, id. at 14. He further rejected Texaco's
argument that its use was transformative 'because it was important for rcientists
like Chickering to work with a photocopy and not with the original" Id. Oddly,
though, he qualified this rejection in the following statement: "Wf the original
were copied onto plastic paper so that it could be used in a wet environment, onto
metal so that it would resist extreme heat, onto durable archival paper to prevent
deterioration, or onto microfilm to conserve space, this might be a persuasive
transformative use." This qualification though, conflicts with the nature of
transformative use. See Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 16, at 111L On ap-
peal, Judge Newman got the issue right when he explained that:
Texaco's photocopying merely transforms the material objcct embodying
the intangible article that is the copyrighted original work. Sec 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 102 .... Texaco's making of copies cannot properly be regarded
as a transformative use of the copyrighted material.
Texaco, 37 F.3d at 891.
Finally, Judge Leval correctly rejected Texao's rather ludicrous argument that
its use should be favorably weighed under the first fair use factor because the
principal purpose of that use was, allegedly, "to state reported facts accurately"
802 F. Supp. at 15. As Judge Leval observed, Chickering copied the entire article,
often before he had even read it.
"Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 6.
" Id. at 15.
19951
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itiveness and profitability."39
B. The Second Fair Use Factor: The Nature of the Copyrighted
Work
Although agreeing with the plaintiff-publishers that
"[clopyright protection is vitally necessary to the dissemination
of scientific articles of the sort that are at issue, ' 0 Judge
Leval also noted that courts have routinely held that in evalu-
ating the second factor "the scope of fair use is greater with
respect to factual than nonfactual works."' In a rare analysis
of this statement, Judge Leval questioned whether it
may be nothing more than the logical consequence of two other
principles: First, that facts are not subject to copyright owner-
ship,... and second... that quotation when done for the purpose
of reporting facts accurately has a high claim for recognition as a
favored purpose under the first fair use factor 2
In any event, Judge Leval concluded that the material
copied by Texaco-reports on scientific experimental re-
search-was "essentially factual in nature," and he therefore
weighed the second factor in Texaco's favor.43
C. The Third Factor: The Amount and Substantiality of the
Material Copied
Texaco had copied the entirety of the articles and the suit
involved infringement of individual articles and not the jour-
nals. Yet, Texaco argued that in evaluating the extent of its
copying under the third factor, the journal issue should be the
yardstick because plaintiff Academic Press only registered the
issue, not the individual articles.44 Judge Leval rightly reject-
ed this attempt to tie copyright registration practices to the
" Id. at 16.
" Id. Importantly, this observation was not dependent upon authors being
compensated, with Judge Leval noting that "copyright protection is essential to
finance the publications that distribute them," id., publications that might have a
small subscription base.
"I Id., quoting New Era Publications Intl ApS v. Carol Publishing Group, 904
F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 297 (1990).
Id. at 17. See criticism of the statement in PATRY, supra note 6, at 506-07.
Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 17.
UId.
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fair use analysis, weighing the third factor in the plaintiffs'
favor.
45
D. The Fourth Factor: The Effect of the Use on the Potential
Market
With the fourth factor, it was the publishers' turn to argue
(and with apparent success) the relevance of the journal issue
as a whole. The publishers asserted that but for its unautho-
rized photocopying, Texaco would have been forced to purchase
additional subscriptions or back issues. If Texaco wanted the
individual articles, the publishers asserted that Texaco could
order photocopies from licensed document delivery services,
obtain a license from the publisher or pay for the copies
through the CCC.46 In rebuttal, Texaco argued that Academic
Press would not receive substantial additional revenues if it
ceased making unauthorized photocopies because what its
scientists desire is a photocopy of a particular article, not a
back issue of the journal in which it appeared. Texaco also
noted that Academic Press only makes reprints available with
a minimum order of 100 copies, an amount that in most cases
made acquiring reprints impractical.47
Even accepting Texaco's argument that it would not vastly
increase the number of subscriptions it took if it stopped its
unauthorized photocopying, Judge Leval held that the number
would, nevertheless, increase somewhat. He also noted that
Texaco had not contradicted the probability that its scientists
would place orders with document delivery services which
would in turn pay a royalty to the publishers." He therefore
SId.
' Id. at 18.
Id. at 18-19. Texaco also made the plainly absurd argument that the fact
that the plaintiffs' revenues had been steadily growing showed that copying did no
harm to the market and perhaps indicated a greedy motive since authors of scien-
tific, technical and medical journals rarely are paid. Id. at 19, 20, 26, 27. Judge
Leval rightly condemned Texaco's argument as a "demagogic effort to undermine
the publishers' rights by tarring them as wealthy profiteers [that] carries no force
in copyright analysis, which does not begrudge copyright profits," id. at 27, adding.
"It is an odd argument, furthermore, to be made by an oil company that reported
over $2.4 billion net income for fiscal 1989 on revenues of over $32 billion." Id. at
27 n.25.
43 Id. at 19.
1995]
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concluded that "plaintiffs have powerfully demonstrated enti-
tlement to prevail as to the fourth factor."49
Judge Leval's greatest contribution to analysis of the
fourth factor may have been his careful and prescient interpre-
tation of the then often-quoted statement from Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises ' that the market factor
is "the single most important element" of fair use. As Judge
Leval observed, the context of the statement is important,
because the Harper & Row Court actually ascribed importance
to all four factors.5' Judge Leval's views were subsequently
borne out by the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc.,52 which agreed with his treatment of fair use as
involving a weighing of all four factors, rather than as a doc-
trine with one superfactor, the fourth.53
E. Other Factors
Another important part of Judge Leval's opinion is a sec-
tion entitled 'Equitable Rule of Reason."' This section dis-
cusses a number of arguments made by Texaco, which in
Judge Leval's view, did not "fit neatly into the four-factor anal-
ysis."55 This section of the opinion focuses principally on
Texaco's reliance on the Supreme Court's opinion in Sony Corp.
of America, Inc. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 6 and the
Court of Claims's opinion in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States.57
Judge Leval began generously by stating that "Sony and
Williams & Wilkins do not purport to defime the heartland of
fair use. To the contrary, they present themselves as defining
Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 18.
471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
s' Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 21.
6 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994).
On appeal, Judge Newman made this point explicit, writing that Campbell
had effectively disavowed Harper & Row's statement, by "[aipparently abandoning
the idea that any factor enjoys primacy . " Texaco, 37 F.3d at 894.
Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 21-27.
' Id. at 22.
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd per curiam by an equally divided Court,
420 U.S. 376 (1975).
[Vol. 61:429
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its remote extremities." s Unlike the private, noncommercial
time-shifting of free broadcast television programming involved
in Sony, Texaco's copying was done for a "competitive commer-
cial advantage" and involved material which was licensed for a
fee.59
Judge Leval's lengthy analysis of Williams & Wilkins'z is
especially enlightening.6 Two points in particular should be
noted. First, unlike the nonprofit copying by the government
scientists ii Williams & Wilkins--done to advance medicine
and medical research generally-Texaco's copying was for
profit. Second, at the time of the Williams & Wilkins decision,
the CCC had not been established. With the availability of
CCC licenses, authorized document delivery services and other
private license agreements, the Court of Claims's concerns
about high transaction costs and the injury to scientific re-
search from a ban on photocopying were no longer present.'
Loss of licensing fees from the CCC was thus properly consid-
ered harm to the copyright owner's market, an issue that
would later divide the Texaco court of appeals.'
F. Section 108
Finally, Texaco argued that it was "entitled to prevail
either directly under Section 108 of the Copyright Act... or on
a penumbra of Section 108 reflected in analysis of Section
107."" Judge Leval correctly held that 'there is no merit to
these arguments."' Texaco's library was not covered by sec-
tion 108, and even assuming it were, its copying was per-
formed for commercial purposes, contrary to that section, and
Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 22.
Id. Ever-ready with far-fetched arguments, Texaco asserted that having pur-
chased a subscription to Catalysis, it had been "invited by the publisher to read
it and make photocopies to facilitate such reading. Id.
Id. at 22-26.
61 He also noted that Williams & Wilkins vms not precedent in the Second
Circuit and had been severely criticized by commentators, including this author.
Id. at 22-23 n.20.
IId. at 25-26. Judge Leval also rejected Texaco's claim that the transactional
service was unreasonably burdensome. Id.
3See infra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 27.
6Id.
1995]
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more than one copy was made at a time, again contrary to that
section.
Here too, Judge Leval's opinion is extremely well-reasoned,
persuasive and remarkably prescient on how the Supreme
Court would subsequently interpret issues concerning produc-
tive and commercial uses and the (lack of) primacy of the
fourth factor.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in a two-to-one
decision. Agreeing with the district court, Judge Newman's
majority opinion weighed the first, third and fourth factors in
favor of the copyright owners, and the second in favor of Texa-
co. The majority opinion also agreed with the district court's
analysis of other equitable considerations.66
A. The Majority Opinion
While it affirmed the district court's decision, the majority
opinion of Judges Newman67 and Winter originally took a
much narrower view of the issues sub judice. It will be recalled
that the parties' stipulated evidentiary use of eight particular
articles by Texaco research scientist Chickering from Catalysis
was not intended to limit the case to those randomly selected
facts, but rather to treat those facts as representative of
Texaco's overall copying practices. The use of representative
facts was also consistent with plaintiffs' treatment of the Texa-
co litigation as a test case brought, in part, to obtain a judg-
ment that would encourage corporations to sign up with the
CCC. In particular, the publishers wanted to press corpora-
tions to subscribe to the annualized license service rather than
to subscribe to the transactional license service as Texaco had.
It is unclear whether this objective was achieved, since Judge
" The original opinion, reported at 37 F.3d 881, amended on denial of rehear-
ing on December 23, 1994, was subsequently replaced with an amended opinion
and amended dissent issued on July 17, 1995, reported at 60 F.3d 913. This
amended opinion is broader in its holding than the original opinion. See infra
text accompanying notes 69-71.
' Chief Judge Newman was not on the panel when argument was heard. He
replaced District Judge Charles Stewart upon Judge Stewart's subsequent illness.
[Vol. 61: 429
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Newman explicitly rejected the parties' attempt to treat the
case
as if it concerns the broad issue of whether photocopying of scientific
articles is fair use, or at least the only slightly more limited issue of
whether photocopying of such articles is fair use when undertaken
by a research scientist engaged in his own research. Such broad
issues are not before us c
In its original October 28, 1994 opinion, the court of ap-
peals limited the case to the eight articles that formed the
basis of the stipulation,69 or more precisely, to "the archival
photocopying revealed by the record-the precise copying that
the parties stipulated should be the basis for the District
Court's decision now on appeal and for which licenses are in
fact available." ° In other words, the issue resolved was only
whether the unreported photocopying of eight particular arti-
cles from a particular journal by a particular Texaco scientist
for which a CCC license was available was fair use. Yet, the
trial stipulation permitting the fair use issues to be decided
solely on the photocopying practices of a randomly chosen
Texaco researcher was made not only to avoid unnecessary dis-
covery and trial time, but also because there was nothing
unique about any individual researcher's practices or the arti-
cles he photocopied. Moreover, litigating myriad repetitive fact
patterns would be economically unrealistic: even using limited
facts, the Texaco case took a decade from filing to appellate
decision.
In an amended opinion issued on July 17, 1995, however,
the majority dramatically altered the scope of its holding, prop-
erly treating the copying by the randomly selected researcher
as representative of all of Texaco's scientists:
Rather, we consider whether Texaco's photocopying by 400 or 500
scientists, as represented by Chickering's example, is a fair use.
This includes the question whether such institutional, systematic
copying increases the number of copies available to scientists while
avoiding the necessity of paying for license fees or additional sub-
scriptions.... Our concern is whether the copying of these eight
Texaco, 60 F.3d at 916. The original opinion referred to a reearch scientist
"employed at a for-profit corporation." Texaco, 37 F.3d at 884.
Texaco, 37 F.3d at 884.
7 Id. at 899. The case was limited to the individual articles rather than the
periodicals in which they appeared. Id. at 886.
1995]
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articles, as representative of the systematic copying that Texaco
encouraged, was properly determined not to be a fair use."
At the same time, in a passage that reads like a carefully
negotiated compromise among different members of the court
of appeals en banc, the amended opinion adds:
We do not deal with the question of copying by an individual, for
personal use in research or otherwise (not for resale), recognizing
that under the fair use doctrine or the de minimis doctrine, such a
practice by an individual might well not constitute an infringement.
In other words, our opinion does not decide the case that would
arise if Chickering were a professor or an independent scientist
engaged in copying and creating files for independent research, as
opposed to being employed in the pursuit of his research on the
institution's behalf.2
The majority began its analysis with a discussion of
whether fair use should be available at all as a defense in
cases involving mere mechanical reproduction, such as photo-
copying:
[If the issue were open, we would seriously question whether the
fair use analysis that has developed with respect to works of author-
ship alleged to use portions of copyrighted material is precisely ap-
plicable to copies produced by mechanical means.!3
71 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 916. This alteration in the scope of the holding is also
apparent in a number of other revisions made in the opinion. For example the
second background paragraph at page 883 of the original opinion read in relevant
part:
To avoid extended discovery and narrow the scope of the one-issue trial,
the parties made a significant stipulation, providing that the fair use
trial would focus exclusively on the photocopying of particular journal
articles by one Texaco researcher.
Texaco, 37 F.3d at 883.
The amended opinion replaces this with the following:
Although Texaco employs 400 to 500 research scientists, of whom all or
most presumably photocopy scientific journal articles to support their
Texaco research, the parties stipulated-in order to -spare the enormous
expense of exploring the photocopying practices of each of them-that one
scientist would be chosen at random as the representative of the entire
group.
Texaco, 60 F.3d at 915. This amended opinion completely reverses the original
opinion's limitation to Chickering's particular copying and instead (properly) treats
his copying as representative of all the Texaco scientists' copying. Compare 37
F.3d at 899 ("Our ruling is confined to the archival photocopying revealed by the
record.") with 60 F.3d at 931 ("Our ruling is confined to the institutional, system-
atic, archival multiplication of copies revealed by the record ... .
72 Texaco, 37 F.3d at 884.
7 Id. at 885. This issue was also relevant to the Court of Claims's decision in
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The majority, however, correctly believed that the issue was
not open due to the Supreme Court's Sony decision, which
permitted at least one form of mechanical reproduction, home
video time-shifting of free broadcast television programming.7 4
The court therefore applied the traditional four-factor fair use
analysis to the photocopying issue before it.'
1. The First Factor: The Purpose and Character of the
Use
Consistent with its approach to the case, the majority
opinion delved at great length into the nature of and circum-
stances surrounding Texaco scientist Chickering's copying of
the eight articles from Catalysis. Chickering came across six of
the articles when the original journal issue was circulated to
him; he became aware of the other two through citations in
other publications. Chickering had the eight articles photo-
copied "at least initially, for the same basic purpose that one
would normally seek to obtain the original-to have it avail-
able on his shelf for ready reference if and when he needed to
look at it."6 As he explained, the copies were made for his
"personal convenience."' Judge Newman characterized this
photocopying as '"archival'--i.e., done for the primary purpose
of providing Chickering with his own personal copy of each
article without Texaco's having to purchase another original
journal."' Under the Campbell decision, this use merely su-
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Cl. Ct. 1973), affd per
curiam by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). In a different part of its
opinion, the Texaco majority rejected the company's reliance on photocopying as
"reasonable and customary," agreeing with Judge Leval that "[t]o the extent the
copying practice was 'reasonable' in 1973, it has ceased to be 'reasonable' as the
reasons that justified it before [unavailability of photocopy licensing] have ceased
to exist." 820 F. Supp. at 25 (quoted in Texaco, 37 F.3d at 892).
' Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
' Texaco, 37 F.3d at 885-86.
7' Id. at 887.
7 Id.
I Id. at 887-88. Chickering made use in his research of five of the eight arti-
cles he had photocopied. Because researchers of all types (including attorneys) may
not know in advance whether they will actually make use of an article-epecially
before photocopying it to read at a later time--any determination of whether a use
is fair based on the ultimate use made of the article photocopied may well prove
impossible.
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persedes the original and "tilts the first fair use factor against
Texaco." 9
The intervention of the Campbell opinion between the
opinions of the district court and court of appeals also influ-
enced the court of appeals's treatment of the commercial na-
ture of the copying. Perceptively recognizing that Campbell
had rejected interpretations of Sony as erecting a presumption
against commercial uses, 0 Judge Newman observed that, in-
stead, the commercial nature of the defendant's use simply
"tends to weigh against a finding of fair use."" Texaco ar-
gued, however, that its use was not commercial and that the
district court had inappropriately focused on the character of
the user rather than on the nature of the use.82 While agree-
ing that a court's focus should be on the use rather than the
user, the majority did not consider Texaco's status as a for-
profit company irrelevant.' Discussing whether Texaco's use
Regarding Texaco's claim that Chickering was engaged in "research" within
the meaning of the preamble to § 107, Judge Newman wrote:
Chickering has not used portions of articles from Catalysis in his own
published piece of research, nor has he had to duplicate some portion of
copyrighted material directly in the course of conducting an experiment
or investigation. Rather, entire articles were copied as an intermediate
step that might abet Chickering's research.
79 Id. But cf., 60 F.3d at 919-20.
Texaco, 37 F.3d at 889. Judge Newman stated:
Indeed, Campbell warns against "elevat[ing] . . . to a per se rule" Sony's
language about a presumption against fair use arising from commercial
use .... Campbell discards that language in favor of a more subtle,
sophisticated approach, which recognizes that "the more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like com-
mercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use." ... The Court
states that "the commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a work is
only one element of the first factor enquiry," . . . and points out that
"[i]f, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of
fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative
uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107 ... 
Id. (citations omitted).
" Id. (quoting Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174).
'2 Id. at 888.
' Id. at 890 n.8 (Citing WILLIAM PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPY-
RIGHT LAW 416-17 (1st ed. 1985) for the principle that "the nature of [the] person
or entity engaging in [the] use affects the character of the use" and REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: LIBRARY REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (17
U.S.C. § 108) 85 (1983) for its conclusion that "though a scientist in a for-profit
firm and a university student may engage in the same photocopying of scholarly
articles to facilitate their research, 'the copyright consequences are different: [the
scientist's] copying is of a clearly commercial nature, and less likely to be fair
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was commercial, Judge Newman concluded:
The commercial/nonprofit dichotomy concerns the unfairness that
arises when a secondary user makes unauthorized use of copyright-
ed material to capture significant revenues as a direct consequence
of copying the original work.&
Consistent with these principles, courts will not sustain a
claimed defense of fair use when the secondary use can fairly
be characterized as a form of "commercial exploitation," i.e.,
when the copier directly and exclusively acquires conspicuous
financial reward from its use of copyrighted material.
While an unauthorized "commercial exploiter" of another's
copyrighted material should indeed have difficulty establishing
a fair use defense, if the above-quoted passage is meant to act
as a more general definition of commercial use, it appears to
be restrictive. Contrary to the majority's formulation, "com-
mercial use" may encompass situations where the defendant's
gain from use of the copyrighted material does not result in
significant revenues and the revenues received from that use
are indirect or speculative. For example, an impermissible use
of excerpts of a politician's unpublished letters in a lengthy,
for-profit history of an era may not appreciably, by itself, gain
the publisher significant revenues, but the use would neverthe-
less be commercial.'
More to the point, the photocopying at issue was done to
facilitate Texaco's development of products for commercial
exploitation. Judge Newman was well aware of this and its
relationship with Texaco's for-profit status (i.e., the nature of
the user rather than the use):
use.").
" Texaco, 37 F.3d at 890. Here, Judge Newman cited cases to support the con-
clusion that
courts will not sustain a claimed defense of fair use when the secondary
use can fairly be characterized as a form of "commercial exploitation,"
i.e., when the copier directly and exclusively acquires conspicuous finan-
cial rewards from its use of the copyrighted material, ... [and creating
a sliding scale by which] [t]he greater the private economic rewards
reaped by the secondary user (to the exclusion of broader public benefits),
the more likely the first factor will favor the copyright holder and the
less likely the use will be considered fair.
Id. (citations omitted).
IThis conclusion does not rest on the publisher's for-profit status. The result
would be the same if the publisher was a nonprofit entity.
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[W]e need not ignore the for-profit nature of Texaco's enterprise,
especially since we can confidently conclude that Texaco reaps at
least some indirect economic advantage from its photocopying. As
the publishers emphasize, Texaco's photocopying for Chickering
could be regarded simply as another "factor of production" utilized in
Texaco's efforts to develop profitable products. Conceptualized in
this way, it is not obvious why it is fair for Texaco to avoid having to
pay at least some price to copyright holders for the right to photo-
copy the original articles.8
Texaco also argued that Judge Leval had placed "undue
emphasis" on whether its use was "transformative."87 Unfor-
tunately for Texaco, the "transformative use" concept developed
by Judge Leval' was warmly endorsed by the Supreme Court
in Campbell, a point noted by Judge Newman.89 As an appar-
ent alternative argument, Texaco contended that its photocopy-
ing was transformative because it converted the original jour-
nal article "into a form more easily used in a laboratory. '" °
The majority rightly rejected this absurd argument," which
entirely misses the nature of the necessary transformation: the
creation of a new work. As Judge Newman pointed out, Texaco
merely transformed the material object in which the work was
embodied, not the work itself.9 Under Texaco's theory, all
copying-or at least all mechanical copying of entire
works-would be transformative, rendering the concept either
meaningless or more readily available to those who least fit its
purpose."
,8 Texaco, 37 F.3d. at 890-91.
'7 Id. at 888.
See Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 16, at 1111.
Texaco, 37 F.3d at 891.
9 Id.
91 Id.
2Id.
At the same time, Judge Newman stated, "we should not overlook the sig-
nificant independent value that can stem from conversion of original journal arti-
cles into a format different from their normal appearance." Id. The value of such
conversion accrues only to the user, however, and not to society, and thus should
not weigh in the defendant's favor in the fair use analysis.
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2. The Second Factor: The Nature of the Copyrighted
Work
Agreeing with Judge Leval, the Second Circuit weighed
the nature of the work copied in Texaco's favor. The court held
that while the writing of the articles undoubtedly entailed
creativity, their predominantly factual nature was the more
important consideration.94
3. The Third Factor: Amount and Substantiality of the
Material Used
As it had in the district court, Texaco argued on appeal
that the proper yardstick for evaluation of the third factor was
the issue or volume of Catalysis rather than the individual
article. The court of appeals noted, however, that the litigation
involved the individual articles and not the issue or volume.
Thus, following Judge Leval, the court of appeals properly
rejected Texaco's argument." Judge Newman also explained
that the third factor permits the court to "gain insight into the
purpose and character of the use as we consider whether the
quantity of the material used was 'reasonable in relation to the
purpose of the copying," thereby drawing attention to the
interrelationship of the third and first factors.
4. The Fourth Factor: Effect of the Use on the Potential
Market
Two months after its initial opinion was published, the
court of appeals, in denying Texaco's petition for rehearing,
made a number of changes in its original opinion,9 7 all but
one of which concerned the fourth factor in fair use analysis.
These revisions reflect the far-reaching changes in the fourth-
factor analysis made by the Supreme Court's Campbell deci-
sion and considerably strengthen the Second Circuit's opinion.
9" Id. at 893.
Texaco, 37 F.3d at 894.
Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1175 (1994)).
The Second Circuit issued its opinion on October 28, 1994. On December 23,
1994, rehearing was denied.
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In particular, the revised opinion perceptively notes that the
Supreme Court downplayed the importance it had previously
ascribed to the fourth factor:
Prior to Campbell, the Supreme Court had characterized the fourth
factor as "the single most important element of fair use," Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 566.... However, Campbell's discussion of the
fourth factor conspicuously omits this phrasing. Apparently aban-
doning the idea that any factor enjoys primacy, Campbell instructs
that "[aill [four factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed
together, in light of the purposes of copyright."
Hopefully, other courts will adopt Judge Newman's careful
reading of Campbell and return to the flexible evaluation of
fair use that had been the hallmark before its statutory recog-
nition in section 107 of the 1976 Act mistakenly led some to
conclude that Congress intended to introduce rigidity into what
is still a common law doctrine.99
In evaluating the fourth factor, Judge Newman observed
that since the works sued upon were individual journal articles
rather than the journal as a collective work, the relevant po-
tential harm was to the market for the articles rather than for
the journal.1"0 So defined, proving potential harm to the mar-
ket became somewhat problematic for the plaintiffs since there
is no traditional market for sales of individual scientific, tech-
nical and medical articles, and since most authors of those
articles do not seek or receive compensation for their writ-
ings. 10
" Texaco, 37 F.3d at 894 (quoting Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171) (citations
omitted).
9 See Judge Leval's masterful discussion of the post-1976 Act period in Leval,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Use, supra note 16.
"' Texaco, 37 F.3d at 894-96. By contrast, harm to the market for the journal
might involve loss of per-issue sales, back volumes, or loss of multiple subscrip-
tions. Judge Newman did add, though, that
Were the publishers able to demonstrate that Texaco's type of photocopy-
ing, if widespread, would impair the marketability of journals, then they
might have a strong claim under the fourth factor. Likewise, were Texaco
able to demonstrate that its type of photocopying, even if widespread,
would have virtually no effect on the marketability of journals, then it
might have a strong claim under this fourth factor.
Id. at 896.
101 Id. at 895. The authors, however, typically assign their copyright to the
journal publisher so that any lack of payment to the author from reprints or li-
censing revenue is arguably beside the point. See also discussion of this issue in
Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 26-27.
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These facts heightened the significance of the potential
loss of licensing revenues through the CCC. Judge Leval had
found that if Texaco's use was not fair, publishing revenues
would increase significantly as Texaco would be forced to nego-
tiate directly with the publishers, obtain copies from document
delivery services which pay royalties to publishers, or acquire a
license from the CCC. Texaco argued that Judge Leval's rea-
soning was circular since if its use was fair, it need not pay
licensing fees, an argument picked up by Judge Jacobs in his
dissent."2 Judge Newman effectively answered the circularity
argument in the following passage:
lilt is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a
particular use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth
fair use factor when the means for paying for such a use is made
easier. This notion is not inherently troubling it is sensible that a
particular unauthorized use should be considered "more fair' when
there is no ready market or means to pay for the use, while such an
unauthorized use should be considered 'less fair" when there is a
ready market or means to pay for the use. The vice of circular rea-
soning arises only if the availability of payment is conclusive against
fair use."
While sensible as applied to the facts in Texaco, this pas-
sage may go too far in making its point if it is interpreted as a
categorical statement about the availability of the fair use
defense. There is no reason why a use should necessarily be
more likely to be fair if there is no ready licensing system: the
copyright owner may have deliberately chosen not to set up
such a system, preferring instead to negotiate individually
with users.' In the context of the case before it, however,
the majority aptly noted that the existence of the CCC ren-
dered consideration of lost licensing revenues an appropriate
consideration, 10 a victory for the plaintiffs. This conclusion
was fortified by two citations to Congress, the first to section
102 Id. at 904 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 898.
104 Because this statement was dictum and the Texaco majority carefully con-
fined its holding to the facts before it, it would be inappropriate to apply the
statement to other facts and media, such as the lack of licenses for on-line com-
puter uses.
'z' Texaco, 37 F.3d. at 898-99. At the same time, the majority stated it did not
decide "how far the fair use balance would be resolved if a photocopying license
for Catalysis articles were not currently available." Id. at 899.
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108 and its restrictions on library photocopying and the second
to statements in Senate Judiciary Committee reports encourag-
ing development of the CCC. 1°6 Once the court concluded that
loss of licensing revenues was a relevant consideration under
the fourth factor, the weighing of that factor against Texaco
was preordained.
B. Judge Jacobs's Dissent
In a spirited dissent, Judge Jacobs disagreed with the
majority's treatment of the first and fourth factors, concluding
that Texaco's use was fair. Regarding the first factor, Judge
Jacobs agreed with Texaco that Chickering's activities consti-
tuted "research" within the ambit of the preamble to section
107."7 At the same time, relying heavily on the Court of
Claims's 1973 decision in Williams & Wilkins-overruled by
Congress in the 1976 Act-Judge Jacobs stated that a use that
is "reasonable and customary" is fair use, and opined that
Chickering's use was reasonable and customary, 10 8 as well as
transformative. 9 Regarding the fourth factor, Judge Jacobs
disagreed that the CCC constituted a workable method for
licensing institutional users,"' adding that even if it were
workable, the availability of a license should not weigh against
Texaco since if its use was fair no license was required.'
CONCLUSION AND THE PARTIES' SETTLEMENT
If the principal goal of the publisher-plaintiffs in the Texa-
co litigation was securing an authoritative opinion that all
corporate photocopying of scientific, technical and medical
journals was not fair use, they may have failed. At the same
time, the court of appeals's amended July 17, 1995 opinion,
with its broader holding on Texaco's systematic, institutional
copying, is likely to encourage more corporations to subscribe
to the CCC's annualized license service. Moreover, if one objec-
"' Id. at 899.
107 Id. at 901 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 902.
Id. at 903.
"o Id. at 905-06.
"' Texaco, 37 F.3d at 906.
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tive of the plaintiffs in the Texaco litigation was forcing Texaco
to acquire an annualized license, they were successful, albeit,
quite late in the game. On May 15, 1995, while defendant's
petition for certiorari and petition for rehearing en banc were
pending, the parties announced a settlement. According to one
press account, Texaco "conceded no wrongdoing," but agreed to
pay "a seven figure settlement and retroactive licensing fee to
the CCC. In addition, Texaco will enter into standard annual
license agreements with the CCC during the next five
years.""2 The only real mystery to the settlement is why it
was not made ten years ago.
50 BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 57 (May 18, 1995).
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